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Electronic coordination links markets at diﬀerent locations that have initially been (partially)
separated by transport costs. Rising competitive pressure should in turn aﬀect incentives to dif-
ferentiate products. In this paper investment decisions concerning transport cost reduction and
product diﬀerentiation are analyzed in a heterogenous product duopoly where ﬁrms compete
in two spatially separated markets. We show that ﬁrms always have non–negative incentives
to invest in transport cost reduction, while there exist parameter ranges where product dif-
ferentiation will actually be reduced after an exogenous reduction of transport cost. We also
compare social and privat investment incentives for both price strategies (most likely with dig-
ital products) and quantity competition (capacity decisions for physical products). Based on
these results we discuss in detail how investment decisions are likely to diﬀer from the eﬃcient
solution for each of the two kind of products.
Key words: Electronic markets, Strategic investments, Transport costs,
Product diﬀerentiation
Durch elektronische Koordination wachsen r¨ aumlich getrennte M¨ arkte zusammen, die bislang
nur unvollst¨ andig ¨ okonomisch integriert waren. Der daraus resultierende verst¨ arkte Wettbe-
werbsdruck sollte die Anreize der Unternehmen zur Produktdiﬀerenzierung eigentlich erh¨ ohen.
Wir analysieren die Interaktion der Investitionsentscheidungen in transportkostensenkende elek-
tronische Koordination und in verst¨ arkte Produktdiﬀerenzierung in einem Duopol mit r¨ aumlich
getrennten M¨ arkten. Wir zeigen, dass immer ein zumindest schwach positiver Anreiz zur In-
vestition in Transportkostensenkung besteht, w¨ ahrend Parameterbereiche existieren in denen
die Unternehmen nach einer exogenen Senkung der Transportkosten die Produktdiﬀerenzierung
verringern. Des Weiteren vergleichen wir soziale und private Investitionsanreize sowohl bei
Preisstrategien (plausibel bei digitalen G¨ utern) als auch bei Mengenwettbewerb (realistisch als
Kapazit¨ atsentscheidung bei physischen Produkten) und diskutieren im Detail, welche Abwe-
ichung von der eﬃzienten Entscheidung bei jeder der beiden Produkttypen zu erwarten ist.
Schlagworte: Elektronische M¨ arkte, Strategische Investition, Transportkosten,
Produktdiﬀerentierung
JEL–classiﬁcation: D43, D61, L132 E–Commerce in Oligopoly: Impact on Transport Costs and Product Diﬀerentiation
1 Introduction
Markets in diﬀerent locations that have been at least partially separated by high transport
costs may be linked more closely by the possibility of selling products or services via electronic
coordination. The point is that distance becomes less important as a determinant of transport
and thus total distribution costs. This impact of electronic commerce is most obvious for digital
or digitalizable products and services: Think of software which can be directly downloaded and
therefore must no longer been shipped to the customer or a local store. However, assuming
transport cost reductions may also be reasonable for physical products or for services if a broader
deﬁnition of transport costs is applied that also includes opportunity costs of customers, which
may for example result from the time consuming walk to a local store or bank oﬃce. Declining
transport costs will aﬀect the incentives of ﬁrms to diﬀerentiate their products because spatial
separation no longer hinders ﬁerce competition. In addition, electronic coordination may yield
new ways to diﬀerentiate products and thus changes the cost of product diﬀerentiation. Think
for example of selling notebooks online: While Toshiba as a traditional producers sells a limited
number of prespeciﬁed notebook types, at Dell’s online store the customer can explicitly decide
about the combination of components she likes and this customized notebook will be built
to order. Considering that usually neither transport cost reductions nor extended product
diﬀerentiation come for free, the interaction of investment decisions in these two areas must be
understood when discussing the impact of electronic coordination in such markets.
The present paper aims at analyzing this interaction in a relatively simple framework that
nevertheless highlights the most important stylized facts. We consider two spatially separated
duopoly markets, each served by a local ﬁrm and, if transport costs are not prohibitive, also by
its distant competitor.1 This means that we do not consider competition between a start-up ﬁrm
and an incumbent but have in mind a situation where ﬁrms have been active, at least in their
local market, before the advent of electronic commerce. Think of banks located in diﬀerent
towns, hardware producers in diﬀerent countries or music labels in Europe vs. the United
States. Each of the two ﬁrms is assumed to produce a variant of a horizontally diﬀerentiated
product. For given levels of transport costs and degree of product diﬀerentiation ﬁrms compete
by simultaneously setting prices or quantities, respectively.
We consider both price and quantity strategies mainly because we want to distinguish between
two types of products: Physical goods and digital goods. While most markets with physical
goods may be appropriately described by an oligopoly model with quantity strategies (this is
the case if setting capacities is the most important strategic decision),2 this approach is not
1Extension to an oligopoly with three or more local markets is straightforward as long as transport costs
between each pair of local markets are assumed to be identical.
2As shown by Kreps/Scheinkman (1983) the Cournot model may be interpreted as the reduced form of
a two–stage game where ﬁrms decide about capacity at the ﬁrst stage and set prices in the second stage. See
also G¨ uth (1995) who extends the analysis by considering a heterogenous good oligopoly.1. Introduction 3
adequate for digital goods like software or MP3 music: A digital good may be reproduced almost
unlimited at very low marginal costs and thus setting capacities (i. e. quantities) is not likely
to be a strategic issue. Digital and physical goods are, however, not only diﬀerent with respect
to strategic variables in the output market: The potential of transport cost reduction is much
more limited for physical goods that have still to be shipped to the customer and the necessary
investment in logistics should yield much higher investments for a given level of transport cost
reduction. It also seems more likely that electronic commerce provides additional potential for
product diﬀerentiation in the case of digital goods. As will be shown, due to these diﬀerences
the impact of electronic coordination may be quite distinct for the two types of product
The direct approach to analyzing the problem would be to determine closed form solutions of
the two–stage game with simultaneous decisions on investments in both product diﬀerentiation
and transport cost reduction in the ﬁrst stage and price or quantity competition in the second
stage. However, we decided to use a more indirect way: We ﬁrst determine derivatives of proﬁt
and welfare functions with respect to transport costs and degree of product diﬀerentiation. In
a second step we apply this information to discuss private investment incentives for all possible
initial values of transport costs and product diﬀerentiation. Finally we compare private and
social incentives by focusing on the diﬀerences in the ﬁrst order conditions of the two problems
at the equilibrium values. While we do not obtain explicit solutions, by combining our results
with the stylized facts about digital and physical products discussed above, we are able to
determine the most likely outcome in any of the two cases. A major advantage of the indirect
approach lies in the fact that we need not restrict attention to some speciﬁc investment cost
functions but must only assume that these functions are suﬃciently convex to guarantee interior
solutions in the ﬁrst stage of the game.3
Investment incentives in electronic coordination have already been discussed in Bakos (1997)
in a model where ﬁrms could reduce search costs of their customers by implementing an elec-
tronic market. He argued that incentives of all sellers as a group are too low while a single seller
might overinvest. However, in his paper a formal analysis of this decision is not performed: He
just assumes that ﬁrms may capture a certain proportion of the buyers eﬃciency gain. Another
closely related paper is Belleflamme (2001) who explores the so called “productivity para-
dox” of investment in information technologies (IT). He explores this paradox in a quantity
setting oligopoly with a similar demand structure as in our model by considering a lump–sum
investment in either production cost reducing or product diﬀerentiating IT. While the structure
of his model is similar to ours in many respects, his focus is on a completely diﬀerent question
and because he does not consider price strategies and investment is only modeled in lump–sum
3Note also that ﬁrst order conditions in the second stage are to complicated to obtain analytical solutions
with the direct approach even for a relatively easy speciﬁcation with quadratic investment costs (for linear
investment costs the problem is not concave). While we carried out some numerical simulations to check
whether our arguments based on the indirect approach are correct, relying solely on numerical solutions for
some speciﬁc cases would have been unsatisfactory.4 E–Commerce in Oligopoly: Impact on Transport Costs and Product Diﬀerentiation
fashion, his results can not be applied to our speciﬁc problem. Finally, papers about product
and/or process innovation by Bester/Petrakis (1993), Rosenkranz (1996),a n dq u i t e
recently Lin/Saggi (2002) also analyze investments in cost reduction and/or product diﬀer-
entiation. However, they restrict attention to interior solutions in symmetric situations while
we assume higher transport costs for the distant ﬁrm (at least initially) and do also discuss
corner solutions (e. g. the decision not to invest and to stay out of the distant market).
We proceed as follows: In section 2 we discuss the speciﬁcation of the output stage and derive
second stage equilibria under both price and quantity competition for given levels of transport
costs and degree of product diﬀerentiation. Based on this, in section 3 we determine derivatives
of proﬁts and consumer surplus, discuss marginal and global investment incentives of the ﬁrms,
and analyze how private equilibria diﬀer from the socially eﬃcient solution. Section 4 concludes
by relating the results obtained to the stylized facts about digital and physical goods. This
allows us to determine the likely impact of the advent of electronic coordination in diﬀerent
industries and to draw some provisionally policy conclusions.
2 Competition in the output stage
As mentioned in introduction, asymmetries with respect to transport costs and the diﬀerences
between physical and digital products are central to our analysis. To consider these aspects in a
relatively simple model, we apply a model structure initially developed in Morasch/Welzel
(2000) and Bandulet/Morasch (2001):
• There are two spatially separated markets each served by a local ﬁrm with transport costs
normalized to zero and, as long as transportation between regions is not prohibitively
expensive, also by the ﬁrm located in the other market.
• Each ﬁrm produces a speciﬁc type of a symmetrically diﬀerentiated product and con-
sumers value product diﬀerentiation per se (see Dixit/Stiglitz, 1977 and Spence,
1976 for this concept of symmetric product diﬀerentiation).
• We assume that ﬁrms produce with linear homogeneous cost functions and that arbitrage
between the two locations is not feasible. Under these assumptions pricing or output
decisions for the two markets are independent and we can restrict attention to one market
only when determining the equilibria for the output stage.4
4See Brander/Krugman (1983) who apply a similar model to analyze reciprocal dumping in an interna-
tional oligopoly. The no–arbitrage condition should be generally fulﬁlled for physical products (transportation
costs even after investment) and also for services (impossibility of reselling). Due to the nature of digital prod-
ucts it may be more diﬃcult to make reselling impossible in this case. However, note that our main results do
not depend on the assumption of separated markets — this assumption only helps to derive these results more
easily.2. Competition in the output stage 5
At this point we will assume that both transport costs and the degree of product diﬀerentiation
are exogenously given. The incentives to invest in a reduction of transport costs or a change in
the degree of product diﬀerentiation will be discussed in the next section.
The consumption side is given by a representative consumer with linear-quadratic utility







2 +2 βx1x2)+x0 (1)
with x1 and x2 indicating the speciﬁc types of the diﬀerentiated good produced by ﬁrm 1 or
2, respectively, and x0 a numeraire good which is assumed to be produced in another sector
of the economy and has been added linearly to ensure that the marginal utility of income is
equal to one. The parameter α is a measure of market size while β describes the degree of
substitutability between the products of the two ﬁrms: If the products are perfect substitutes
β = 1, if they are independent β =0 . 5 For the ease of computation the market size parameter
is normalized to α = 1. Given the utility function for α = 1, the consumer maximization
problem leads to linear inverse demand functions
pi =1− xi − βxj with j  = i. (2)
Demand functions expressing quantity demanded as a function of the two prices are necessary




1 − β2[(1 − β) − pi + βpj]. (3)
On the supply side it is assumed that both ﬁrms produce with identical and constant average
costs normalized to zero, i. e. we assume c1(x1)=c2(x2) = 0. Transport costs of the local ﬁrm
1 are also zero while transport costs from the other location are given by t ≥ 0. Proﬁts in the
output stage under (Cournot-) quantity competition, πC
i ,a r e
π
C
1 (x1,x 2)=x1(1 − x1 − βx2)( 4 )
π
C
2 (x1,x 2,t)=x2(1 − x2 − βx1) − tx2 (5)
while proﬁts in the case of price strategies (Bertrand–competition), πB











2 (p1,p 2,t)=( p2 − t)
 
1
1 − β2[(1 − β) − p2 + βp1]
 
(7)
5Similar demand speciﬁcations are frequently used in the literature on strategic investments — see e. g.
Bester/Petrakis (1993) or Lambertini/Rossini (1998).6 E–Commerce in Oligopoly: Impact on Transport Costs and Product Diﬀerentiation
Now equilibria in the output stage for given transport costs t of ﬁrms 2 and given degree of
product diﬀerentiation β will be determined. This is done by simultaneously solving the ﬁrst
order conditions — in the case of quantity competition with respect to (x1,x 2) and under price
strategies with respect to (p1,p 2). For Cournot competition output and prices in equilibrium
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(2 − β)+t(2 − β2)
4 − β2 (11)
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(1 − β)(2 + β) − t(2 − β2)





(1 − β)(2 + β)+2 t
4 − β2 . (15)
A reduction in transport costs reduces prices and quantities of the local ﬁrm and thus clearly
has a negative impact on this ﬁrm’s proﬁt. Also, considering that returns per unit of the distant
ﬁrm is given by p2−t, a reduction in transport yields higher prices and quantities for the distant
ﬁrm.
These results are only valid as long as second period proﬁts of ﬁrm 2 exceed zero — otherwise the
market is only served by the local ﬁrm. This restriction is met as long as transport costs do not
exceed ¯ tC or ¯ tB, respectively. These limiting values are determined by inserting the equilibrium
levels of quantities or prices into the expressions for π2 (see (5) for quantity competition and








(1 − β)(2 + β)
2 − β2 . (17)
Note that ﬁrm 1 behaves as an unrestricted monopolist under both quantity and price compe-
tition if the transport costs exceed ¯ tC. However, under price competition the distant ﬁrm is
a potential competitor for ¯ tC >t>¯ tB and thus prices set by ﬁrm 1 are below the monopoly2. Competition in the output stage 7
level. In this case the local ﬁrm sets a limit price pL
1 =( β + t − 1)/β that ensures that x2 =0
— πL
1 is obtained by substituting x2 =0a n dp2 = t into the demand function (3) and solving
with respect to π1 (at this limit price ﬁrm 2 could only sell a positive output level if p2 is set
smaller than t which in turn yields negative proﬁt).
We are now able to determine proﬁts and consumer surplus as functions of t and β.N o t et h a t
in a market with symmetrically diﬀerentiated products consumer surplus must be calculated
based on the utility function - it is not correct to add up the values for consumer surplus in
the market for each speciﬁc product (see Vives, 1985). Taking into account that consumers
have to pay the market price for each unit of the product we obtain the following formula for
consumer surplus (net utility) derived from the consumption of x1 and x2:







2 +2 βx1x2) (18)




















































    
    
[(1−β)(2+β)−tβ]2


















    
    
[(1−β)(2+β)−t(2−β2)]2















    


















Figure 1 shows the three relevant areas in a (β,t)–diagram: Parameter combinations in area
A (“active competitor”) yield two active ﬁrms in the market for both price and quantity com-
petition. In area A/P the distant ﬁrm is active in a quantity setting duopoly while it serves8 E–Commerce in Oligopoly: Impact on Transport Costs and Product Diﬀerentiation
as a potential competitor in the case of price strategies (P stands for “potential competitor”).
Finally, in area N (“no competitor”) the local ﬁrm is an unrestricted monopolist. When we
analyze investment incentives, it is important to consider in which area (β,t)i sl o c a t e db e f o r e
and after the investment decision(s).
Figure 1: Areas with and without active distant ﬁrms










A: π2 > 0 A/P: π2
B < 0
Source: Mathematica plot based on own calculations
3 Interaction of investment incentives
As already discussed in the introduction, we do not try to determine the equilibrium values
of transport costs and degree of product diﬀerentiation by solving the two–stage game with
simultaneous investment decisions in the pre–output stage, but have instead chosen to use
a more indirect approach: We derive our results by inspecting the derivatives of proﬁts and
consumer surplus with respect to transport costs and degree of product diﬀerentiation (i. e.
by considering the marginal returns of the investment) and by comparing at the equilibrium
values the ﬁrst order conditions of the ﬁrst stage maximization problems of the ﬁrms and a
social planer, respectively. Assuming suﬃciently convex investment costs (to ensure interior
solutions) and including information about second stage proﬁt functions, we are able to discuss3. Interaction of investment incentives 9
marginal and global investment incentives for given initial values of t and β. Based on the
diﬀerences between digital and physical products we can then determine the likely impact of
electronic coordination on private investment decisions. In a next step we compare private
and social incentives: We start at some private strategies equilibrium and analyze how social
incentives depart from private ones at the given equilibrium combination of transport costs
and degree of product diﬀerentiation. This allows us to determine for all possible equilibrium
values of t and β whether a social planer would like to rise or lower investments marginally.
By adding information on cross–derivatives, for most cases we can even tell the direction of a
discrete step towards the social optimum.
3.1 Derivatives of proﬁts and consumer surplus
In a ﬁrst step we will now determine the derivatives of proﬁts and consumer surplus with respect
to t and β. Let us start by considering the eﬀect of a marginal change in transport costs in the





2β(2 − β)+2 β2t





4[(2 − β) − 2t]




(1 − t)(4 − 3β2)+β3
(2 − β)2(2 + β)2 (27)
As easily can be seen, in the parameter range with interior solutions (areas A and B in ﬁgure
1) a marginal reduction of transport costs beneﬁts the distant ﬁrm and consumers while it
hurts local ﬁrms due to intensiﬁed competition. The same is true for price competition in the
parameter range with an active distant ﬁrm (area A in ﬁgure 1), however, due to the more





2β(1 − β)(2 + β)+2 β2t





2[(1 − β)(2 + β)(2 − β2)] − 2t[(2 − β)2]




(1 − β)(2 + β)2 − t(4 − 3β2)
(1 − β2)(2 − β)2(2 + β)2 (30)
The strategic variable in the output market also does not aﬀect the outcome for values of t
that exceed the zero proﬁt restriction of the distant ﬁrm in a quantity setting duopoly: Here
derivatives are all zero because marginal changes in t would not aﬀect ﬁrm behavior. While
this is still true for the distant ﬁrm in the limit pricing range under price competition, due to
lower prices proﬁts of the local ﬁrm are reduced by a fall in transport costs while consumer10 E–Commerce in Oligopoly: Impact on Transport Costs and Product Diﬀerentiation
surplus rises. Derivatives of local ﬁrm proﬁts πL
1 , consumer surplus CSL and welfare W L in















1 − β − t
β2 (33)
The derivatives with respect to β are generally somewhat more complicated. However, a close
inspection shows that proﬁts of distant ﬁrms always rise with a marginal reduction of β,i .e .
more diﬀerentiated products, and that the eﬀect on consumer surplus is qualitatively diﬀerent
for price and quantity competition, respectively: Under price competition the impact of product
diﬀerentiation on competition dominates and thus consumers are hurt by a reduction of β;i n
a quantity setting oligopoly the competition eﬀect is less important than the preferences of
consumers for diﬀerentiated products und thus reducing β yields higher consumer surplus.





2(2 − β)3 +4 t[(2 − β)(2 + β)(1 − β)] + 2t2[(4 + β2)β]
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2t[(1 − β)2(2 + β)(4 + 2β +4 β2 +3 β3)]
(2 − β)3(2 + β)3(1 − β2)2
+
2t2[(4 + β2 − 2β4)β]




= −2[(2 + β)(1 − β) − t(2 − β
2)] ×
[(1 − β)(2 + β)2(1 − β + β2)+t((4 − 2β2 + β4)β)]




3[(1 − t)(1 − β)2(2 + β)3β]+3 t2[(4 − 5β2 +2 β4)β]
(2 − β)3(2 + β)3(1 − β2)2 (39)
In the limit pricing range (area B) the situation is diﬀerent compared to the parameter area
close to the zero proﬁt constraint: While ﬁrms have still an incentive to make products more3. Interaction of investment incentives 11
homogenous because this enables local ﬁrms to set higher limit prices, consumer surplus and















(1 − t)(1 − β − t)
β3 (42)
Based on the information about proﬁt and consumer surplus for given parameter values and
on the derivatives with respect to t and β, respectively, we are now able to analyze marginal
and global investment incentives of the ﬁrms and to compare private and social incentives in
private investment equilibria.
3.2 Marginal and global investment incentives
In this section we will develop a graphical representation of marginal and global investment
incentives for both transport cost reduction and product diﬀerentiation. The ﬁgure is based on
the eﬀects of changes in t and β on proﬁts in the output stage. However, to discuss investment
incentives we must also generally specify the investment cost functions.
• For investments in a reduction of transport costs it seems reasonable to assume a convex
investment cost function It(t) that is deﬁned in t ∈ [0,¯ t]w h e r e¯ t represents the initial
level of transport costs. Speciﬁcally let It(¯ t)=0 ,I 
t(t) < 0a n dI  
t (t) ≥ 0, i. e. investment
in electronic coordination reduces transport costs, however, at a diminishing rate.
• What are realistic features of a cost function for the investment in product diﬀerentiation?
Following Lin/Saggi (2002), a ﬁrst possibility would be to presume that an investment
by ﬁrm i reduces an initial value of product diﬀerentiation ˆ β by some value di ∈ [0, ˆ β/2]
and that investment costs are given by Id(di)w i t hI 
d > 0a n dI  
d > 0. By additionally
assuming that I 
d(0) = 0 and I 
d(ˆ β/2) to be very large, we could guarantee interior solutions
for initial values of t and β in parameter ranges where more diﬀerentiation increases
ﬁrm proﬁts. However, for t close to prohibitive levels, increasing product diﬀerentiation
actually hurts ﬁrms. If we realistically consider that products in the initial situation
without competition by distant ﬁrms are at least somewhat diﬀerentiated due to slight
diﬀerences in ﬁrm technologies or consumer preferences (these aspects are not explicitly
considered in our model to restrict attention to strategic issues), a modest reduction of
transport costs might yield a scenario where ﬁrms actually want to make their products
more homogenous. In this case it seems most plausible that the necessary changes would
also be costly so that a negative level of di ∈ [−(1− ˆ β)/2),0] would yield investment costs12 E–Commerce in Oligopoly: Impact on Transport Costs and Product Diﬀerentiation
Id(di)w i t hI 
d < 0 (contrary to the assumption for rising product diﬀerentiation these
costs need not be strictly convex).
Based on the information about derivatives of proﬁts we are now able to discuss the likely
interaction of the decisions on transport costs and product diﬀerentiation. As a general result
a marginal reduction of transport costs is always weakly proﬁtable for the distant ﬁrm (weakly
because it will have no eﬀect if the zero proﬁt constraint of the distant ﬁrm is violated) and
thus there will be a general tendency to reduce transport costs. Note, however, that industry
proﬁts will be reduced if transport costs remain substantial but not prohibitive — ﬁrms face
a classical prisoners’ dilemma in this case. The situation is diﬀerent when ﬁrms decide about
product diﬀerentiation because an investing ﬁrm now considers the impact in the local as well
as in the distant market. While diﬀerentiating products is beneﬁcial for relatively symmetric
ﬁrms (i. e. low transport costs), making products more homogenous may raise total proﬁt by
reducing or eliminating the market share of an ineﬃcient distant ﬁrm (i. e. a ﬁrm with relatively
high but not prohibitive transport costs).
Figure 2: Private investment incentives: physical goods
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Source: Mathematica plot based on own calculations
Figures 2 and 3 show the incentives to reduce transport costs and to change the degree of
product diﬀerentiation for quantity and price competition, respectively, for all economically3. Interaction of investment incentives 13
relevant combinations of β and t. Arrows indicate the direction of proﬁtable changes: Solid
lines refer to proﬁtability on the margin, dashed lines to discrete changes that may be beneﬁcial
for some speciﬁc investment cost function. Note that the dividing line between N2 and A1 is
given by the zero proﬁt condition πC
2 = 0, the line between A1 and A2 by ∂Πi/∂β =0( w i t hΠ i
as the sum of second stage proﬁts of ﬁrm i in both the local and the distant market) and the line
between A2 and A3 by the condition Πi(β,t)=Π i(1,t) (to the left the sum of proﬁts for some
degree of product diﬀerentiation β is at least as high as the sum of proﬁts in a homogenous
good duopoly). The additional line in ﬁgure 3 between P and A1 is deﬁned by πB
2 =0( i nP
the distant ﬁrm is only a potential competitor).
We start by discussing the somewhat less complicated scenario with quantity competition (phys-
ical products):
• If the transport cost reduction comes for free, ﬁrms would always have an incentive to
reduce t to some level below the zero proﬁt constraint for ﬁrm 2 (the line that divides the
areas N2 and A1). However, in N1 and N2 there is no incentive for a marginal change of
t because as long as t is above the zero proﬁt constraint the distant ﬁrm will stay out of
the market.
• While in area N1 ﬁrms cannot increase their proﬁt by changing β, in zone N2 a costless
reduction of β to a value in A3 would raise proﬁts relative to the situation with a monopoly
in each local market. The reason is that for β close to zero the markets for the two varieties
are almost independent and thus proﬁts of the local ﬁrm remain largely unaﬀected by
the entry of the distant competitor. Note, however, that a marginal change of β will not
change proﬁts because distant ﬁrms do not enter.
• In A1 transport costs are low enough to make entry proﬁtable for the distant ﬁrm. How-
ever, this decision is ineﬃcient in the sense that total proﬁt of each ﬁrm from the local
and the distant market together is reduced. Therefore marginally increasing β (making
products more homogenous) makes a ﬁrm better oﬀ by lowering the market share of dis-
tant ﬁrms or even driving them out of the market. On the other hand, as in N2, a large
reduction of β to area A3, i. e. a substantial increase in product diﬀerentiation, would
yield higher proﬁts than making products more homogenous.
• In A2 and A3 the problem of ineﬃcient entry is less important (it is completely absent for
t = 0). Therefore a marginal decrease of β raises proﬁts. While decreasing β is globally
optimal in A3, depending on the speciﬁcation of the investment cost function, a discrete
change that makes products more homogenous may still be optimal.
The picture for price strategies (digital goods) looks quite similar. In fact areas N1 and N2
are unchanged while for A2 and A3 only the exact course of the borderlines is altered. The14 E–Commerce in Oligopoly: Impact on Transport Costs and Product Diﬀerentiation
main qualitative variation is the area between N2 and A2, which in contrast to the situation
under quantity competition is now divided into P and A1. The small zone A1 yields the same
result as the respective area under quantity competition. However, in P there is only potential
competition and thus the local ﬁrm would not beneﬁt from a marginal reduction of transport
costs.
Figure 3: Private investment incentives: digital goods
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Let us now interpret the results in light of the diﬀerences between physical and digital prod-
ucts. The situation for given values of t and β is quite similar for both kind of products,
despite for relatively homogenous goods and intermediate transport costs (the area with po-
tential competition in the case of price strategies). However, it can be argued that for digital
products equilibria after investments in electronic coordination are likely to result in low levels
of transport costs and substantial product diﬀerentiation, while relatively high transport costs
and less diﬀerentiation is the most probable outcome under quantity competition (physical
products): Electronic coordination might reduce transport costs of digital goods and services
substantially or even to zero at modest investment levels and might also provide additional
possibilities to diﬀerentiate such products. For physical products the necessary investment in3. Interaction of investment incentives 15
logistics makes transport cost reductions more costly and even after substantial investment
there will remain transport cost disadvantages for distant ﬁrms; also competition in markets
with (almost) homogenous goods is much less pronounced under quantity competition and the
impact of electronic commerce on options to diﬀerentiate products should be more limited for
physical goods. Equilibria with digital goods are therefore most likely in zone A3 with low
transport costs and a substantial degree of product diﬀerentiation. For physical goods, how-
ever, equilibria could very well be in areas N2, A1 or A2 with prohibitive or almost prohibitive
transport costs and a relatively low degree of product diﬀerentiation. Here it is possible that
ﬁrms might either decide not to invest in transport cost reducing electronic coordination (in
N2) or to react on a reduction of transport costs by making products more homogenous (in A1
and A2).
3.3 Private vs. social investment incentives in equilibrium
After having discussed the private investment incentives, which enabled us to predict the impact
of electronic commerce in markets with digital and physical products, respectively, we will now
deal with the question how private equilibria are likely to diﬀer from the social optimum: Will
there be underinvestment because ﬁrms do not get all the beneﬁts caused by their investment
or will the ﬁrms overinvest because negative impacts on other ﬁrms or consumers are not taken
into consideration?
To highlight the basic idea of our approach, we start by analyzing the easiest case — investment
in transport cost reduction for an exogenously given level of product diﬀerentiation. Additional
considerations for investment in product diﬀerentiation and simultaneous decisions on both
forms of investment will be discussed below. Analyzing the social eﬃciency of investments in
transport cost reduction is less complicated for two reasons: (i) Looking at the derivatives of
proﬁts and consumer surplus, it can easily be seen that an investment always raises proﬁts of
the investing ﬁrm and consumer surplus while it reduces proﬁts of the local ﬁrm. (ii) Because
pricing and output decisions in the two markets are independent for a given degree of product
diﬀerentiation, we can restrict attention to one market and in the investment stage only the
distant ﬁrm is an active player. As shown in Bandulet/Morasch (2001) the problem can
thus be analyzed as follows: Let t∗ be an interior solution of the maximization problem of ﬁrm








Accordingly for an interior solution ˆ t of the welfare maximization problem, the following ﬁrst
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The investment decision by ﬁrm 2 is socially eﬃcient, i. e. t∗ = ˆ t, if the external eﬀects on
proﬁts of the local ﬁrm and on consumers just cancel out (see Farrell/Shapiro, 1990 for
applying a similar concept of external eﬀects to merger policy): The marginal loss of consumer







Note that overinvestment relative to the social optimum results if the left hand side of equation
(45) exceeds zero (a reduction of investment would raise t which in turn would induce a positive
external eﬀect), while underinvestment coincides with the sum of partial derivatives being
below zero (a transport cost reducing investment, i. e. a reduction of t, would then reduce
the negative external eﬀect). Inserting the formulas of the derivatives from section 3.1 into
(45) and solving for t∗, we can determine the parameter combinations of t and β with under-
or overinvestment, respectively. As shown in Bandulet/Morasch (2001) the borderline
with eﬃcient investment is given by t∗ =1 − β for both price and quantity competition.
Overinvestment will result for higher transport costs in equilibrium (up to the zero proﬁt
constraint of the distant ﬁrm), while we get underinvestment when equilibrium transport costs
are below this borderline but higher than zero.
The analysis becomes generally more complicated for investment in product diﬀerentiation and
simultaneous decisions on both forms of investment. The main reason is that markets are
no longer independent and we have to consider the strategic interaction of private investment
decisions. Let us ﬁrst consider the determination of the degree of product diﬀerentiation for
a given level of transport costs. Here the ﬁrms non–cooperatively decide about investment
levels Id(di) in a simultaneous move game, while a social planer determines β by choosing an
combination (d1,d 2) that maximizes welfare. With π
j
i as proﬁts in market j of a ﬁrm that is
























First order conditions for the maximization problem of a social planer generally diﬀer from
(46) and (47) because he additionally considers the impact of a change in di (and thus β)o n
consumer surplus and on the proﬁts of ﬁrm j and because he will decide on the cost minimizing
mix of (d1,d 2) to achieve some level of β. Therefore, at ﬁrst sight, the procedure applied
for the determination of the level of transport cost reductions does not seem to work here.
However, because investment cost functions Id are assumed to be convex and identical for both
ﬁrms, the cost minimizing way to obtain a given level of β calls for d1 = d2. Thus investment
levels in a social optimum must be the same at both ﬁrms. On the other hand, as ﬁrms are3. Interaction of investment incentives 17
symmetric when considering the complete model with both markets together, we also know
that in a economically sensible private strategies equilibrium d1 must equal d2. Therefore some
degree of product diﬀerentiation β will be achieved by the same investment level d = d1 = d2
under both private and social investment decisions. Similar to the determination of transport
cost reductions, we can thus derive one ﬁrst order condition for each case based on derivatives
with respect to β. This is done by ﬁrst substituting d for d1 and d2, respectively, and then
multiplying the ﬁrst order conditions by dd/dβ.W i t hΠ i = πi
i +π
j
i as gross proﬁts of ﬁrm i in



















as ﬁrst order conditions under private strategies and social optimization, respectively. Noting
that Πi =Π j in equilibrium due to symmetry, a borderline in (β,t)–space with eﬃcient private







Under quantity strategies the solution of (50) with respect to t coincides with the zero proﬁt
constraint for the distant ﬁrm. We consequently observe always underinvestment in product
diﬀerentiation in the parameter space with interior solutions. The underlying reason is that
more product diﬀerentiation not only beneﬁts the other ﬁrm but also consumers (the positive
eﬀect of higher gross utility with more diﬀerentiated products dominates the negative impact
of higher prices due to reduced competition). The situation is diﬀerent with price strategies
because here the price eﬀect of less diﬀerentiation is very pronounced if goods are already
close substitutes (with homogenous goods and zero transport costs price would equal marginal
cost). Therefore we observe overinvestment in product diﬀerentiation for low lelvels of product
diﬀerentiation. If, however, products are substantially diﬀerentiated in equilibrium we might
get the underinvestment result as in the case of price competition. The borderline that results
under price competition is deﬁned by a quite complicate expression without any direct economic
interpretation and we will therefore not display this expression but only present the resulting
borderline in ﬁgure 5.
When discussing simultaneous decisions on both investment in transport cost reduction and
product diﬀerentiation, we could directly apply the results derived above if we restrict attention
to marginal changes of investment levels. However, because we want to compare two diﬀerent
equilibria we actually must deal with discrete changes. Here we face the following problem:
Suppose that we have underinvestment in both transport cost reduction and product diﬀerenti-
ation. We can only be sure that investment in product diﬀerentiation in the social optimum is
indeed higher as in the private strategies equilibrium if lower transport costs do not reduce the18 E–Commerce in Oligopoly: Impact on Transport Costs and Product Diﬀerentiation
incentive to invest in product diﬀerentiation. To deal with this problem, we must determine the
cross–partial–derivatives of proﬁts and welfare with respect to t and β. Based on the results
obtained in section 3.1 this is a straightforward exercise. Fortunately these cross–derivatives
are unambiguously positive in the parameter range with interior solutions for both price and
quantity strategies, meaning that a transport cost reduction always increases the incentives to
invest in product diﬀerentiation and vice versa.
We are now able to display our results in two ﬁgures for quantity and price competition,
respectively. Note that we have t∗ and β∗ on the axes in ﬁgure 4 and 5, indicating that we are
now dealing with equilibrium values after investment. The solid lines refer to the borderlines
between over- and underinvestment while the dashed lines indicate the incentives of ﬁrms and
the social planer to reduce or increase the degree of product diﬀerentiation.
Figure 4: Private vs. social investment incentives: physical goods
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Let us start with ﬁgure 4 which deals with the situation quantity competition (physical goods).
In the area above the zero proﬁt constraint the private decision not to invest is also socially
eﬃcient because below this borderline we have overinvestment in transport cost reduction and
the social planer has a marginal incentive to reduce product diﬀerentiation. For a given degree3. Interaction of investment incentives 19
of product diﬀerentiation the private strategies equilibrium yields overinvestment in transport
cost reduction for equilibrium levels of transport costs close to the zero proﬁt constraint and/or
relatively homogenous products, while the ﬁrms underinvest if transport costs are nearly zero
and/or products are quite diﬀerentiated. Because for a given level of transport costs equilibrium
investment in product diﬀerentiation is too low from a social point of view for all parameter
combinations with interior solutions, the latter result still holds in the case of simultaneous
determination of both t and β.
The situation is diﬀerent in the area above the borderline for eﬃcient private investment in
transport cost reduction. Here we can only rule out that the social planer would both invest
less in product diﬀerentiation and more in transport cost reduction. All other combinations are
possible: For example higher transport costs in the social optimum make investment in product
diﬀerentiation less attractive which represents a countervailing force to the higher investment
incentive of the social planer for a given level of transport costs. Therefore a social optimum
with lower transport costs and both more or less homogenous goods is possible. The same kind
of reasoning can be put forward by starting with a higher degree of product diﬀerentiation and
showing that transport costs may then be either lower or higher in the social optimum.
When looking at ﬁgure 5 for price competition, we notice two main diﬀerences: (i) Because
consumer surplus increases in β, there are now parameter ranges with overinvestment in product
diﬀerentiation. We thus have an additional borderline that indicates combination of β and t
where private and social incentives coincide; also the borderline for no private investment
incentives lies now above the respective line for the social planer. (ii) We must speciﬁcally
consider the area between the zero proﬁt constraints of the distant ﬁrm for quantity and price
strategies, respectively, where the distant ﬁrm serves as a potential competitor of the local
monopolist.
Considering investment in transport costs for a given degree of product diﬀerentiation, results
are exactly the same as under quantity competition except for the area between the two zero
proﬁt constraints where we get underinvestment. In this area the distant ﬁrm has no incentive
for a marginal investment because it would stay out of the market even after investment. There-
fore we obtain a private investment equilibrium in this parameter range with zero investment.
However, there exists a social incentive to invest because the limit price of the local ﬁrm would
be reduced and thus welfare (the sum of producer and consumer surplus) would increase.
The outcomes for investment in product diﬀerentiation are quite similar: For given transport
costs underinvestment is assured for relatively low values of β∗ and t∗ while overinvestment
results in the rest of the area with interior solutions. In the limit pricing range there is underin-
vestment because more product diﬀerentiation would make the distant ﬁrm a more “dangerous”
potential competitor which reduces the monopoly power of the local ﬁrm. Finally, above the
zero proﬁt constraint for quantity competition the private decision not to invest is again eﬃ-
cient.20 E–Commerce in Oligopoly: Impact on Transport Costs and Product Diﬀerentiation
Figure 5: Private vs. social investment incentives: digital goods
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What can be said if both investment levels are determined simultaneously? The results from
above are robust in the two underinvestment regions (to the lower left and under limit pricing),
in the lens with overinvestment in transport cost reduction and product diﬀerentiation (between
the zero proﬁt constraint and the borderline for investment in transport cost reduction) and
also in the “no investment” range. Only in the triangle like area between the borderlines with
eﬃcient investment in β and t, respectively, a deﬁnite result can not be obtained: We can only
state that it is not possible for both transport costs to be higher and products to be more
diﬀerentiated in the social optimum (all other combinations of under- and overinvestment can
happen).
We can now discuss the probable outcome for the two diﬀerent kind of products. (i) Due to the
speciﬁc characteristics of physical products, it is most likely that equilibria are in the upper right
area of ﬁgure 4 with either the eﬃcient decision not to invest or overinvestment in transport
cost reduction for a given level of product diﬀerentiation. In the latter case, however, for a given
level of transport costs ﬁrms underinvest in product diﬀerentiation (as they do in the whole
area with interior solutions) and the result is therefor unclear if both t and β are determined4. Conclusion 21
simultaneously. (ii) The situation is diﬀerent for digital goods (price competition— see ﬁgure
5): Here equilibria tend to be in the area with underinvestment in transport cost reduction
or eﬃcient investment to zero transport costs. If a high degree of product diﬀerentiation is
feasible at relatively low costs, underinvestment in both product diﬀerentiation and transport
cost reduction will result if ﬁrms decide on both investments simultaneously. As in the case
with physical products we do not obtain a deﬁnite result if products remain more homogenous
in equilibrium, because now ﬁrms overinvest in product diﬀerentiation for a given level of
transport costs.
4C o n c l u s i o n
Electronic coordination enables ﬁrms to reduce transport costs to distant markets and oﬀers
new opportunities to diﬀerentiate products. In the present paper we applied a spatial het-
erogenous good duopoly model with either price or quantity strategies (i) to discuss marginal
and global incentives of ﬁrms to invest in transport cost reduction or product diﬀerentiation
and (ii) to analyze how private and social investment incentives diﬀer. We also argued that the
appropriate model structure and the likely eﬀects are diﬀerent for physical and digital products,
respectively: Competition in markets with physical products may be best analyzed in a quan-
tity setting oligopoly because capacities are likely to be important; also substantial transport
cost disadvantages for the distant ﬁrm will remain even after investing in electronic commerce.
On the other hand, a model with price competition is more appropriate for digital products and
here transport costs near zero are quite probable after investment. By combining the results
obtained in the formal analysis with the speciﬁc characteristics of physical and digital products,
respectively, we are able to predict the likely outcomes in any of the two cases and to discuss
potential implications for public policy.
Because a reduction of transport costs increases competitive pressure, one would generally ex-
pect that ﬁrms will consequently have an incentive to rise the degree of product diﬀerentiation
to counteract this eﬀect. However we obtained the surprising outcome that product diﬀerenti-
ation may actually be decreased if initially prohibitive transport costs are reduced somewhat
below the zero proﬁt constraint of the distant ﬁrm. What is the intuition behind this result? By
making products more homogenous the market share of the distant competitor is diminished
and this ﬁrm may even be driven out of the market. While it is evident that this gives the
local ﬁrm an incentive to reduce the degree of product diﬀerentiation, it is not yet suﬃcient to
explain why a ﬁrm that also acts in a distant market has such an incentive. Here we need the
additional argument that relatively high transport costs yield low proﬁt margins in the distant
market and thus the positive eﬀect in the local market dominates the negative impact in the
distant one. Note that if transport costs go down further, we obtain the expected outcome with
incentives to increase product diﬀerentiation.22 E–Commerce in Oligopoly: Impact on Transport Costs and Product Diﬀerentiation
How likely is it that products become actually more homogenous and what can be said about
the social eﬃciency under private investment?
• As mentioned above, for physical products it is probable that equilibrium transport costs
(i. e. after investment) are still substantial or even prohibitive. While we did not show
explicitly that ﬁrms could reach an equilibrium with both lower transport costs and more
homogeneous goods when they simultaneously decide about both investment levels, one
can at least easily imagine situations where an exogenous reduction of transportation
costs (e. g. lower network prices due to technological progress in the network industry)
triggers a reduction of product diﬀerentiation. Concerning the comparison of social and
private investment incentives, the private decision not to invest is also socially eﬃcient.
On the other hand, a deﬁnitive conclusion is not possible for transport costs between
the zero proﬁt constraint and the borderline with eﬃcient investment in transport cost
reduction: For a given degree of product diﬀerentiation private investment exceeds the
socially optimal one and for given transport costs we observe underinvestment in product
diﬀerentiation; if, however, ﬁrms simultaneously decide about both investments, the only
thing we deﬁnitely know about the social optimum is that there will not be both lower
transport costs and more homogeneous products.
• For digital products quite low or even zero transport costs are the most likely outcome in
a private strategies equilibrium and in this case ﬁrms have a great incentive to increase the
degree of product diﬀerentiation. From a social point of view, underinvestment in both
transport cost reduction and product diﬀerentiation results if products are substantially
diﬀerentiated in the private strategies equilibrium. Otherwise we have overinvestment in
product diﬀerentiation and if ﬁrms invest simultaneous we can thus only rule out that a
social planer chooses both lower investment in transport costs and higher investment in
product diﬀerentiation. It should be noted that outcomes in the limit pricing range seem
only probable if there is almost no potential for product diﬀerentiation.
Given that results are highly sensitive and that for both kinds of products we do not obtain
deﬁnitive outcomes in the most likely situations, it seems most sensible to call for a “hands
oﬀ” policy in this area. It should, however, be noted that we assumed that the decisions of
the ﬁrms are made non–cooperatively. However, especially when considering the investment in
transport cost reduction, ﬁrms will have an incentive to collude which would deﬁnitely result
in underinvestment relative to the social optimal level. Insofar competition policy should be
reluctant to allow cooperation in this pre–competitive area.References
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